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PART II
Paul C. Giannelli
Professor of Law
Case Western Reserve University
This is the second in a series of articles examining the Rules of Evidence as they apply in criminal
cases.
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RULE 201: JUDICIAL NOTICE
Rule 201 is the only provision governing judicial
notice in the Rules of Evidence. The rule is limited
to judicial notice of adjudicative facts. According
to the Staff Note, Rule 201 "in its entirety, reflects
existing Ohio practice .... " This statement is
somewhat misleading. Although numerous Ohio
decisions fit comfortably within the framework of
Rule 201, these cases do not distinguish between
adjudicative and legislative facts as does Rule 201,
nor is it clear that mandatory judicial notice of
facts was recognized prior to the adoption of Rule
201(D). In addition, the procedure for taking judicial notice set forth in Rules 201(E) and (G) was
not specified in the prior cases.
Judicial Notice of Law
Rule 201 is limited to judicial notice of adjudicative facts. There is no provision governing judicial
notice of law in the Rules of Evidence. Judicial
notice of law is governed by Criminal Rule 27,
which provides that the "judicial notice and determination of foreign law provisions of Civil Rule
44.1 apply in criminal cases." Civil Rule 44.1(A)
governs judicial notice of Ohio law, including municipal ordinances and administrative regulations.
See also R.C. 2941.12 (judicial notice of statutes in
criminal cases).
Adjudicative Facts
Rule 201 is limited to judicial notice of adjudicative facts. The term "adjudicative" fact is used in
contradistinction to the term "legislative" fact.
Both terms were coined by Professor Davis. See
Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 364, 402

(1942); Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Colum. L. Rev.
945 (1955). Professor Davis described adjudicative
facts as follows:
When a court or an agency finds facts concerning the
immediate parties - who did what, where, when, how,
and with what motive or intent - the court or agency
is performing an adjudicative function, and the facts
so determined are conveniently called adjudicative
facts ....Stated in other terms, the adjudicative facts
are those to which the law is applied in the process of
adjudication. They are the facts that normally go to
the jury in a jury case. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55
Colum. L. Rev. 945, 952 (1955).

For example, if an accused is charged with grand
theft of an automobile, the prosecution is required
to prove that the value of the automobile was
$150.00 or more. See R.C. 2913.02(8). The value of
the automobile is an adjudicative fact; it is a "fact
of the case" that would normally be decided by a
jury.
In contrast to adjudicative facts (the facts of the
case), legislative facts are those facts "which have
relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking
process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body." Advisory Committee
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 201. According to Professor
Davis, when a court "develops law or policy, it is
acting legislatively; the courts have created the
common law through judicial legislation, and the
facts which inform the tribunal's legislative judgment are called legislative facts .... Legislative
facts are those which help the tribunal to determine the content of law and policy and to exercise
its judgment or discretion in determining what
course of action to take." Davis, Judicial Notice,
55 Colum. L. Rev. 945, 952 (1955).
While the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts may be clear in many cases, in
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by which an appellate court may review the facts and
law of a case and intelligently decide whether the
findings of the lower court are supported by the evidence where the evidence is unknown. Such an assumption would be a denial of due process. /d. at 173.

other cases the distinction is anything but clear.
See 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence
405-15 (1977); 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal
Practice and Procedure 474-81 (1977).
Kinds of Facts Subject to Judicial Notice
Rule -201(8) specifies two kinds of facts that are
subject to judicial notice: (1) facts generally known
within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court,
and (2) facts capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned. These two categories of facts, however, are limited to facts that are
"not subject to reasonable dispute." By limiting
judicial notice to indisputable facts, Rule 201 has
adopted the Morgan view of judicial notice. See
Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269
(1944). Two consequences follow from the adoption of this theory of judicial notice. First, once a
fact is judicially noticed by the court, evidence
tending to establish or rebut that fact is inadmissible. Second, the jury must accept the judicially
noticed fact and is so instructed. There is, however, one deviation from the Morgan theory that is
recognized by the rule. Rule 201(G) provides that in
criminal cases the jury shall be instructed that
they are not bound to accept a judicially noticed
fact.
Procedure for Taking Judicial Notice
Rule 201(C) permits a court to take judicial notice sua sponte, notwithstanding the absence of a
request by either party. Rule 201(0) requires the
court to take judicial notice if requested by one of
the parties. If the fact is one capable of accurate
and ready determination, the requesting party also
must supply the court with sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. The requirement of mandatory judicial notice upon request appears to represent a change in Ohio law. See
Zimmerman v. Rockford Stone Co., 93 Ohio L. Abs.
47, 49, 196 NE(2d) 474, 476 (C.P. 1963) ("The taking
of judicial notice in situations such as this is discretionary with the court.").
Rule 201(E) entitles a party, upon timely request,
to an opportunity to be heard concerning both the
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of
the matter to be noticed. In situations in which a
party has no advanced indication that judicial notice will be taken, the party still is entitled to an
opportunity to be heard even if the court has already judicially noticed the fact. The hearing
should be held outside the hearing of the jury. See
Rules 103(C) and 104(C). The provision requiring
that a party be granted an opportunity to be heard
is consitutionally mandated by due process~ In
Garnert v. Louisiana, 368 US 157 (1961), the U.S.
Supreme Court commented:

Rule 201(F) provides that judicial notice may be
taken at any time of the proceedings. Thus, judicial notice may be taken on appeal. The principal
limitation on this use of judicial notice involves
criminal cases in which no evidence on an ultimate fact has been introduced at trial and the trial
court has not judicially noticed that fact. The appellate court should not be permitted to supply the
missing fact on appeal through the use of judicial
notice. See Garner v. Louisiana, 368 US 157, 173
(1961) ("To extend the doctrine of judicial notice to
the length pressed by the respondent would require us to allow the prosecution to do through
argument to this Court what it is required by due
process to do at the trial, and would be 'to turn the
doctrine into a pretext for dispensing with a
trial."'). In United States v. Jones, 580 F(2d) 219
(6th Cir. 1978), the court commented: "Rule 201(g)
plainly contemplates that the jury in a criminal
case shall pass upon facts which are judicially noticed. This it could not do if this notice were taken
for the first time after it had been discharged and
the case was on appeal." /d. at 224.
Jury Instructions
Rule 201(G) governs jury instructions of judicially noticed facts. In criminal cases the court
must instruct the jury that it "may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially
noticed." In effect, judicial notice operates as a
permissive inference in this context. This provision
was added by Congress. According to the House
Judiciary Committee Report, a "mandatory instruction to a jury in criminal case to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed is inappropriate because contrary to the spirit of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial." H.R.Rep.No. 93-650, 93d
Gong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S.
Code Gong. & Ad. News 7075, 7080. See also State
v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600 (1951).
Although Rule 201(G) specifies that the jury is
not bound to accept a judicially noticed fact, it
leaves unanswered the question of whether evidence contravening the fact noticed may be introduced by a criminal defendant. See 21 C. Wright &
K. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure 534-35
(1977).
RULE 301: PRESUMPTIONS
Rule 301 is the only provision governing presumptions in the Rules of Evidence. The rule covers only rebuttable presumptions in civil cases.
There is no rule dealing with criminal presumptions. The U.S. Supreme Court proposed a rule on
criminal presumptions (proposed Federal Rule
303), but it was not enacted by Congress. See 56
F.R.D. 212-14 (1973). Presumptions in criminal
cases, however, are subject to review on constitutional grounds. See County Court of Ulster v. Allen

[U]nless an accused is informed at the trial of the
facts of which the court is taking judicial notice, not
only does he not know upon what evidence he is being convicted, but, in addition, he is deprived of any
opportunity to challenge the deductions drawn from
such notice or to dispute the notoriety or truth of the
facts allegedly relied upon. Moreover, there is no way
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442 US 140 (1979); Barnes v. United States, 412 US
837 (1973)~ C. McCormick, Evidence §§ 344, 346 (2d
ed. 1972).

~;

the difference between sufficiency and admissibility. The evidence as a whole must be sufficient to
permit the issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
Each item of evidence, however, need only advance the inquiry.

RULE 401: RELEVANT EVIDENCE
Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." This definition
embraces the concepts of relevancy and materiality. The phrase "fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action," however, is used in
lieu of the phrase "material fact." Consequently,
to be admissible evidence must be both relevant
and material.
Relevancy concerns the relationship between an
item of evidence and the proposition for which it is
offered to prove. In contrast, materiality concerns
the relationship between the proposition for which
the item of evidence is offered and the issues in
the case. See C. McCormick, Evidence§ 185 (2d
ed. 1972). For example, evidence of the results of a
breathalyzer test tends to prove whether the person tested was intoxicated. The test results are
relevant to the proposition (intoxication). Evidence
of intoxication, however, may not be material
under the substantive law. If the results of a
breathalyzer test ·were offered by a criminal defendant as a defense in an aggravated vehicular
homicide case (R.C. 2903.06), the evidence should
be excluded as immaterial, even though the results
of the test tend to prove intoxication. On the other
hand, if the defendant were charged with aggravated murder (R.C. 2903.01), the same evidence
would be material because it tends to negate the
element of prior calculation and design. See Long
v. State, 109 OS 77, 141 NE 691 (1923).
As noted above, Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of [a material or consequential fact]
more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." This definition is consistent
with Barnett v. State, 104 OS 298, 135 NE 647
(1922), in which the Ohio Supreme Court commented: "Any fact that makes more probable or
less probable, where the probabilities are in question, renders such fact, relevant as evidence ... "
ld. at 306 Accord, State v. Phipps, 3 App(2d) 226,
210 NE(2d) 138 (1964), cert. denied, 382 US 957
(1965).
This standard does not require that the evidence
make a material fact more probable than not, but
only that the material fact be more probable with
the evidence than without the evidence. For example, in a homicide case the prosecution may
Proffer evidence showing a motive on the part of
the defendant. Such evidence does not establish
that it is more probable than not that the defendant committed the crime. The evidence, however,
Would satisfy the standard of Rule 401; it is more
Probable that the defendant committed the crime
the evidence than without it This illustrates

RULE 402: ADMISSIBILITY OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE
Rule 402 is the general provision governing the
admissibility of evidence. Under that rule, relevant
evidence is admissible in the absence of a rule of
exclusion and irrelevant evidence is inadmissible.
Rules of exclusion may be based on a number of
sources, including state and federal constitutional
and statutory provisions, other rules of evidence,
and other procedural rules prescribed by the Ohio
Supreme Court.
U.S. Constitution
Many of the criminal procedure provisions of the
federal Bill of Rights are protected by an exclusionary rule, and consequently evidence obtained
in violation of these constitutional provisions must
be excluded in state trials. For example, evidence
discovered or seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment is subject to exclusion. See Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment). Similarly, statements obtained from criminal defendants in violation of the U.S. Constitution may be
subject to exclusion. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384
US 436 (1966) (self-incrimination clause); Brewer v.
Williams, 430 US 387 (1977) (right to counsel). Evidence of pretrial identifications obtained in violation of constitutional rights also may be excluded.
See Moore v. Illinois, 434 US 220 (1977) (right to
counsel); Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 US 98 (1977)
(due process). Moreover, the Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation may preclude the admission
of evidence - principally hearsay. E.g., Barber v.
Page, 390 US 719 (1968).
Ohio Constitution
The Constitution of Ohio contains a Bill of
Rights, which includes many provisions analogous
to the federal Bill of Rights. For example, Article I,
section 10 provides for the right of confrontation,
the right to compulsory process, and the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination. Similarly,
section 14 of Article I prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Although there is a substantial overlap between
the federal and Ohio Bill of Rights, state courts
may interpret state constitutions to provide greater
protection to criminal defendants and thus exclude
evidence that would be admissible in federal trials.
The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged this aspect of federalism on a number of occasions. See
Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 US 330 (1978); Lego v.
Twomey, 404 US 477 (1978); Cooper v. California,
386 US 58 (1967); Brennan, State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev.
489 (1977).
For example, in State v. Gallagher, 38 OS(2d)
291, 313 NE(2d) 396 (1974), the Court held that an
in-custody parolee was entitled to Miranda warn3

Procedure. For example, Criminc:ll HuJe 12.1 requires notice of intent to offer evidence of alibi.
The requirement imposed by this rule must be
satisfied.

ings before being questioned by his parole officer.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari but then
remanded the case because it was "unable to determine whether the Ohio Supreme Court rested its
decision upon the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, or
Art. 1, § 10, of the Ohio Constitution, or both."
Ohio v. Gallagher, 425 US 257, 259 (1976). On remand, the Ohio Court reinstated its prior decision,
stating that it was "independently constrained to
the result we reached by ttie Ohio Constitution."
State v. Gallagher, 46 OS(2d) 225, 228, 348 NE(2d)
336, 338 (1976).

RULE 403: EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE
Rule 403 specifies the conditions under which a
trial judge is required or permitted to exclude relevant evidence. The application of Rule 403 requires
a three-step process. First, the trial court must determine the probative value of proffered evidence.
Second, the court must identify the presence of
the dangers enumerated in Rule 403(A) - unfair
prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the
jury; or the considerations enumerated in Rule
403(8) - undue delay or the needless presentation
of cumulative evidence. Finally, the court must balance the probative value against the identified
dangers or considerations. If the enumerated
dangers substantially outweigh the probative value
of the evidence, exclusion is mandatory· under
Rule 403(A). If the enumerated considerations substantially outweigh probative value, exclusion is
discretionary under Rule 403(8).

State and Federal Statutes
Rule 402 provides that relevant evidence may be
excluded "by statute enacted by the General Assembly not in conflict with a rule of the Supreme
Court of Ohio .... " A number of provisions of the
Revised Code exclude certain types of evidence or
impose conditions on admissibility. E.g., R.C.
2907.02 (evidence of sexual activity in rape prosecutions); R.C. 4511.19 (evidence of blood-alcohol
content). These exclusionary statutes are controlling if "not in conflict with a rule of the Supreme
Court of Ohio." This provision of Rule 402 is based
on Art.icle IV, § 5(8) of the Constitution of Ohio,
which authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules of practice and procedure that do "not
abridge, enlarge, ·or modify any substantive rights."
Although the phrase "Act of Congress," which
appears in Federal Rule 402, was deleted from the
Ohio rule, some federal statutes are intended to
operate in state as well as federal court, and under
the supremacy clause these provisions would preempt contrary ~tate evidentiary law. For example,
the federal wiretapping and eavesdropping statute
provides:

Unfair Prejudice
Rule 403(A) requires the exclusion of relevant
evidence if the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. In one sense,
all evidence introduced by one party against another is prejudicial to the latter's case in the sense
that it damages that party's position at trial. This
is not the concern of the rule. Only if the evidence
is prejudicial in the sense that the jury cannot
properly evaluate it, does Rule 403 come into play.
Numerous Ohio cases have recognized unfair prejudice as a factor affecting admissibility. E.g., State
v. Strodes, 48 OS(2d) 113, 116, 357 N E(2d) 375, 378
(1976) (evidence admitted because its "probative
value ... was not outweighed by the danger of
prejudicial effect .... "); State v. Woodards, 6
OS(2d) 14, 25, 215 NE(2d) 568, 577, cert. denied, 385
u.s. 930 (1966).
Confusion of Issues; Misleading the Jury
Rule 403(A) requires the exclusion of evidence
whose probative value is substantially outweighed
by the dangers of confusion of issues or of misleading the jury. These factors involve the "probability that the proof and the answering evidence
that it provokes may create a side issue that will
unduly distract the jury from the main issues."
C. McCormick, Evidence 439 (2d ed. 1972). The
Ohio cases have recognized confusion of the
issues as a proper factor in considering the admissibility of relevant evidence. See State v. Curry,
43 OS(2d) 66, 330 NE(2d) 720 (1975); Cottman v.
Federman Co., 71 App 89, 47 NE(2d) 1009 (1942).
See a/so Whiteman v. State, 119 OS 285, 164 NE 51
(1928) ("It is the province of the court to determine
whether such testimony would be misleading ... ")
(syllabus, para. 4).
Discretionary Exclusion
Rule 403(8) permits, but does not require, the

Whenever any wire or oral communication has been
intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department,
officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or
a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that
information would be in violation of this chapter. 18
U.S.C. § 2515 (emphasis added).

Other Rules of Evidence
Relevant evidence also may be excluded by the
operation of other rules of evidence. A number of
exclusionary rules are found elsewhere in the
Rules of Evidence. E.g., Rule 410 (certain types of
pleas and offers to plead in criminal cases); Rule
501 (privileges); Rule 802 (hearsay). Consequently,
an item of evidence may meet the relevancy standard of Rule 401 and nevertheless be inadmissible
because it fails to satisfy the requirements of
some other provision of the Rules of Evidence.
Other Court Rules
Rule 402 also provides that relevant evidence
may be inadmissible due to "other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court of Ohio," which
would include the Rules of Criminal and Juvenile
4

of a particular case. Although the rule requires a
case-by-case analysis, several points deserve comment. First, the rule manifests a definite bias in
favor of admissibility; the dangers or consideratfons must substantially outweigh probative value
before evidence should be excluded. Second, the
federal drafters have indicated that other factors,
such as limiting instructions and alternative
means of proof, should play a part in the trial
court's decision: "In reaching a decision whether
to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction .... The availability of other means of proof
may also be an appropriate factor." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 403. "Other means of
proof" includes stipulations. As one court has
stated: "In achieving this balance [under Rule 403],
the court has the power to require the government
to accept a tendered stipulation in whole or in part
as well as to permit it to reject the offer. to stipulate in its entirety." United States v. Grassi, 602
F(2d) 1192, 1197 (5th Cir. 1979).

trial court to exclude evidence whose probative
value is substantially outweighed by the considerations of undue delay or the needless presentation
of cumulative evidence. These factors involve "the
likelihood that the evidence offered and the
counter proof will consume an undue amount of
time." C. McCormick, Evidence 439-440 (2d ed.
1972). In contrast to the dangers enumerated in
Rule 403(A), the factors of undue delay and the
needless presentation of cumulative evidence are
not intended to protect the integrity of the factfinding process. They entail "no serious likelihood of a
miscarriage of justice ... " Advisory Committee's
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 403, 51 F.R.O. 345 (1971)
(revised draft). Instead these factors are designed
to conserve judicial resources.
The Ohio cases have recognized the trial judge's
authority to exclude cumulative evidence. In Bird v.
Young, 56 OS 210, 46 NE 819 (1897), the trial court
limited the number of witnesses on an issue to six
for each side, "refusing to listen to cumulative
testimony on the same facts and questions by thirteen other persons." The Supreme Court held that
"the matter is within the discretion of the trial
court, and it does not appear affirmatively that the
court abused its discretion in this ruling." /d. at
223-224; accord, Borschewski v. State, 13 App. 362
(1920).
Limitations on the amount of evidence or the
number of witnesses offered by an accused in a
criminal case must also be evaluated in light of
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of compulsory
process. In Washington v. Texas, 388 US 14 (1967),
the Court commented:

RULE 404: CHARACTER EVIDENCE

Rule 404(A) governs the circumstantial use of
character evidence, i.e., the admissibility of evidence of a character trait to prove that a person
acted in conformity with that trait on a particular
occasion. The rule generally prohibits the circumstantial use of character evidence. Three exceptions are recognized; the exceptions relate to (1) a
criminal defendant's character, (2) a victim's character, and (3) a witness' character.
Character of the Accused
An accused in a criminal case may offer evidence of his character. Rule 405(A) limits the
methods by which the accused may introduce
character evidence; under that provision only opinion and reputation evidence may be used, not specific instances of conduct. Moreover, in prosecutions for rape and gross sexual imposition, R.C.
2907.02(0) and R.C. 2907.05(0) control rather than
the rule.
The exception recognized in Rule 404(A)(1) permits the accused to introduce only evidence of a
"pertinent trait of his character." In other words,
the character trait must be relevant to the crime
charged. For example, in Griffin v. State, 14 OS 55
(1862), the Supreme Court held that "[t]he general
character which is the proper subject of inquiry
should also have reference to the nature of the
charge against the defendant. Thus, in the present
case, the defendant being charged with a crime
necessarily importing dishonesty, called witnesses
who gave evidence tending to show a general good
character for honesty." /d. at 63. See also Sabo v.
State, 119 OS 231, 239, 163 N E 28, 31 (1928).
Once the accused has introduced evidence of a
pertinent character trait, the prosecution may offer
character evidence in rebuttal. The same limitations that apply to character evidence offered by
the defense apply to the prosecution. First, the

The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to
compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain
terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts ... [The defendant] has the right to present his own witnesses to
establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law. /d. at 19.

__ See also Ohio Const., art. I, § 10. Consequently, in
criminal cases a trial court should exercise its discretion more cautiously when excluding evidence
proffered by the accused.
Balancing
If the probative value of proffered evidence is
substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair
prejudice, or confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury, exclusion is mandatory under
Rule 403(A). If the probative value of proffered evidence is substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence, exclusion is discretionary
under Rule 403(8). The balancing recognized in
Rule 403 is not new to Ohio law. In State v. Smith,
50 App(2d) 183, 362 NE(2d) 1239 (1976), the court
observed: "[E]vidence, though relevant, should be
excluded when its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the risk that its admission will
cause undue or unfair prejudice." /d. at 197.
Application of Rule 403 requires the trial court to
make a reasoned ad hoc judgment in the context
5

character trait that is the subject of rebuttal must
be "pertinent" to the crime charged. For example,
in a theft case the defense character witnesses
should only be allowed to testify concerning the
defendant's character for honesty. Similarly, therebuttal witnesses' testimony should be limited to
the same trait, i.e., dishonesty. Second, Rule 405(A)
controls the methods of proof which are available
for the presentation of rebuttal evidence. Thus, the
prosecution, like the accused, is limited to opinion
or reputation evidence.
R.C. 2945.56, which permitted the prosecution to
rebut defense character evidence by introducing
the defendant's prior convictions for crimes involv·
ing moral turpitude, is superseded by Rule 405(A).
Character of the Victim
Rule 404(A)(2) permits an accused to present evi·
dence of a pertinent character trait of the alleged
victim of the charged offense. Once the accused
has introduced such evidence, the prosecution
may offer rebuttal evidence. The prosecution, how·
ever, is prohibited from introducing evidence of the
victim's character until the defense "opens the
door." See State v. White, 15 OS(2d) 146, 150-51,
239 NE(2d) 65, 69-70 (1968). Rule 405(A) limits the
methods of proof that the accused and prosecution may use to show or to rebut the character of a
victim; only reputation or opinion evidence is
permitted.
A victim's character may be relevant in two
types of cases: on the issue of self-defense in
homicide and assault cases and on the issue of
consent in rape and gross sexual imposition
cases. In the latter cases, R.C. 2907.02(0) and R.C.
2907.05(0) control rather than the rule. Consequently, Rule 404(A)(2) will be applicable principally on the issue of self-defense. For example, a
homicide defendant could introduce evidence of
the victim's violent and aggressive character to
show that the victim was the first aggressor,
thereby establishing one element of self-defense.
Once evidence of the victim's character is introduced by the accused, the prosecution may introduce rebuttal evidence of the victim's character for
peacefulness.
The prosecution's right to introduce evidence of
the victim's character, however, is not limited to
cases in which the defendant introduces evidence
of the victim's character. Any evidence that the
victim was the first aggressor in a homicide case
triggers the prosecution's right to introduce evi·
dence of the victim's peaceful character.
Character of a Witness
The third exception to the general prohibition
against the use of character evidence concerns
the character of witnesses. This exception, recognized in Rule 404(A)(3), involves the impeachment
use of character evidence and is therefore limited
to the character trait oftruthfulness. Rule 404(A)(3)
does not specify the conditions under which char·
acter evidence may be used to impeach a witness.
Instead, the rule contains a cross-reference to

Rules 607, 608 and 609 which govern the impeachment use of character evidence.
Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts
Rule 404(8) provides that evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts, although not admissible
to prove character, may be admissible for some
other purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident. For example, if
a person steals a gun and later uses that weapon
to commit a murder, the theft may be relevant in
the homicide prosecution to show the identity of
the murderer. Thus, although evidence of the theft
incidentially evidences larcenous character, it is
not being offered for that purpose. See State v.
Watson, 28 OS(2d) 15, 275 NE(2d) 153 (1971). Rule
404(8) supersedes R.C. 2945.59 ("similar acts"
statute).
Rule 404(8) only provides that evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible; the
rule is not mandatory. The rule, however, provides
no standard for deciding when such evidence may
be admitted. Since admission in this instance involves questions of relevance, Rules 401·403 are
the controlling provisions. Rules 401-403, read in
light of the prior Ohio cases, would seem to require that evidence of other acts is admissible
only if the prosecution can establish that (1) the
evidence is offered to prove a consequential or
material fact; (2} such consequential or material
fact is an actual issue in the case; (3) the evidence
tends to prove the consequential fact, and (4) the
danger of unfair prejudice does not substantially
outweigh the probative value of the evidence.
RULE 405: METHODS OF PROVING CHARACTER
Rule 405 specifies the permissible methods of
proving character. It governs how character may
be proved but not when character may be proved.
The latter issue is governed by Rule 404(A). That
provision prohibits the circumstantial use of character unless one of the three enumerated exceptions discussed above is applicable.
Reputation and Opinion Evidence
Rule 405(A) permits the use of reputation evidence to prove character. Reputation is not synon·
ymous with character; it is only one method of
proving character. The Ohio cases have recognized
the use of reputation to prove character. See State
v. Elliott, 25 OS(2d) 249, 267 NE (2d) 806 (1971),
vacated on other grounds, 408 US 939 (1972); State
v. Cochrane, 151 OS 128, 84 NE(2d) 742 (1949);
4 Ohio Jury Instructions§ 411.05 (1974 Provisional).
The offering party must lay a proper foundation
establishing the witness' qualifications to testify
about a person's reputation in the community:
"The preliminary qualifications of the [character]
witness must be such as to advise the court and
the jury that he has the means of knowing such
general reputation of the [person] in the commu·
nity ... "Radke v. State, 107 OS 399, 140 NE 586
(1923) (syllabus, para. 1). In addition, the commu·
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Rule 406 provides only that evidence of habit or
routine practice as proof of conduct is relevant.
Consequently, Rules 402 and 403 also must be
consulted to determine the admissibility of habit
eVidence.
Evidence of habit must be distinguished from
evidence of character because the former is admissible under Rule 406, whereas the latter generally is inadmissible under Rule 404(A). Rule 406,
however, does not define habit. Nevertheless, the
Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 406
quotes extensively from McCormick's description
of habit and character:

nity may not be too "remote," i.e., in a place
"where he has never lived, and where he is not
shown to be generally known or acquainted ... "
Griffin v. State, 14 OS 55 (1862) (syllabus, para. 5).
It is the accused's or victim's reputation at the
time of the charged offense that is relevant for this
purpose.
Rule 405(A) permits the use of opinion as well as
reputation evidence to prove character if character
is admissible under Rule 404(A). Thus, a witness
who is sufficiently acquainted with the accused or
the victim may give his opinion of that person's
character. The Staff Note indicates that Rule 405
"expands Ohio law by permitting the use of opinion
evidence as to character .... At common law, proof
of character was only by evidence of reputation."

Character and habit are close akin. Character is a
generalized description of one's disposition, or of
one's disposition in respect to a general trait, such as
honesty, temperance, or peacefulness. "Habit," in
modern usage, both lay and psychological, is more
specific. It describes one's regular response to a repeated specific situation. If we speak of character for
care, we think of the person's tendency to act prudently in all the varying situations of life, i·n business,
family life, in handling automobiles and in walking
across the street. A habit, on the other hand, is the
person's regular practice of meeting a particular kind
of situation with a specific type of conduct, such as
the habit of going down a particular stairway two
stairs at a time, or of giving the hand-signal for a left
turn, or of alighting from railway cars while they are
moving. The doing of the habitual acts may become
semi-automatic.

Specific Instances; Cross-Examination
In addition to opinion and reputation evidence,
character could be. proved by evidence of specific
instances of conduct. Although evidence of specific instances of conduct may be the strongest
evidence of character, Rule 405(A) prohibits its
use. This follows prior Ohio law. See State v.
Cochrane, 151 OS 128, 134, 84 NE(2d) 742, 745
(1949); Hamilton v. State, 34 OS 82, 86 (1877); Griffin v. State, 14 OS 55, 63 (1862). If character,
however, is an element of a crime or defense,
specific instances may be admitted under Rule
405(8). Because few, if any, crimes or defenses include character as an element, Rule 405(8) rarely
will be applicable in criminal cases.
Rule 405(A) also provides that on "crossexamination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct." The purpose of this inquiry is to test the witness' qualifications for testifying about another's reputation in the community.
In State v. Elliott, 25 OS(2d) 249, 267 N E(2d) 806
(1971), vacated on other grounds, 408 US 939 (1972)
the Supreme Court commented:

The key elements in determining whether conduct is habit are specificity, repetition, and the
semi-automatic nature of the conduct. The factor
of semi-automatic or nonvolitional conduct is illustrated by Levin v. United States, 338 F(2d) 265 (DC
Cir 1964). In Levin the defendant offered evidence
of his "habit" of observing the Sabbath in support
of an alibi defense. The D.C. Circuit upheld the exclusion of this evidence, stating, "It seems apparent to us that an individual's religious practices
would not be the type of activities which would
lend themselves to the characterization of 'invariable regularity.' Certainly the very volitional basis
of the activity raises serious questions as to its invariable nature, and hence its probative value." /d.
at 272.
In Walton v. Elftman, 64 Mise 45, 410 NE(2d)
1282 (C.P. 1980), the court, citing Rule 406, admitted evidence of a person's "habit" of travelling
home from work by a certain route.

A character witness may be cross-examined as to the
existence of reports of particular acts, vices, or associations of the person concerning whom he has testified which are inconsistent with the reputation attributed to him by the witness - not to establish the
truth of the facts, but to test the credibility of the witness, and to ascertain what weight or value is to be
given his testimony. Such inconsistent testimony
tends to show either that the witness is unfamiliar
with the reputation concerning which he has testified,
or that his standards of what constitutes good repute
are unsound. /d. (syllabus, para. 2)

RULE 410: PLEAS AND OFFERS TO PLEAD GUILTY
AND NO CONTEST

RULE 406: HABIT EVIDENCE
Rule 406 provides that evidence of the habit of a
Person and the routine practice of an organization
when offered to prove that a person or organization acted in conformity with that habit or routine
Practice on a particular occasion is admissible.
The phrase "routine practice of an organization"
refers to the "habits" of an organization, commonly known as business practice, usage or custom. The rule specifically provides that the admissibility of evidence of habit does not depend on
either the presence of eyewitness or corroboration.

Rule 410 governs the admissibility of evidence
of (1) withdrawn pleas of guilty, (2) pleas of no contest, including equivalent pleas from another jurisdiction, (3) pleas of guilty in a violations bureau,
(4) offers to plead guilty or no contest, and (5)
statements made in connection and relevant to
such pleas and offers. The rule provides that evidence of all the above is inadmissible in both civil
and criminal cases if offered against the person
who made the offer, plea, or statement. This exclu7

sionary rule also covers the impeachment use of
offers, pleas, and related statements. The rule,
however, carves out an exception for perjury and
false statement prosecutions.
Withdrawn Guilty Pleas
Rule 410 provides that withdrawn guilty pleas as
well as statements made in connection with and
relevant to such pleas are inadmissible. The Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 410 sets forth
two reasons for exclusion in this context. First, the
Note cites Kercheval v. United States, 274 US 220
(1927), for the proposition that admission of a withdrawn guilty plea "would effectively set at naught
the allowance of withdrawal and place the accused in a dilemma utterly inconsistent with the
decision to award him a trial." Second, the Note
cites People v. Spitaleri, 9 NY(2d) 168, 212 NYS(2d)
53, 173 NE(2d) 35 (1961), for the proposition that
admission of a withdrawn guilty plea would "compel [the] defendant to take the stand by way of explanation and to open the way for the prosecution
to call the lawyer who had represented him at the
time of entering the plea." See also State v. Gray,
60 App 418, 399 NE(2d) 131 (1979).
Pleas of No Contest
Rule 410 provides that evidence of pleas of no
contest or an equivalent plea from another jurisdiction as well as statements made in connection
with and relevant to such pleas are inadmissible.
Criminal Rule 11(A) permits a criminal defendant to
plead no contest with the consent of the court.
The exclusion of evidence of pleas of no contest
and related statements is necessary to preserve
the distinction between pleas of no contest and
pleas of guilty . .In this respect, Rule 410 follows
Criminal Rule 11(8)(2) which provides: "The plea of
no contest is not an admission of defendant's
guilt, but is an admission of the truth of the facts
alleged in the indictment, information, or complaint and such plea or admission shall not be
used against the defendant in any subsequent civil
or criminal proceeding." Rule 410 goes beyond
Criminal Rule 11(8)(2) by specifically excluding
statements made in connection with and relevant
to no contest pleas.
Guilty Pleas in Violations Bureau
Rule 410 provides that evidence of a guilty plea
in a violations bureau and related statements are
inadmissible if offered against the person who
made the plea. Traffic Rule 13(A) establishes traffic violation bureaus for all courts except juvenile
courts. Traffic violation bureaus are authorized to
dispose of all traffic offenses except for certain
enumerated serious offenses. Traf. R. 13(8). Traffic
Rule 13(0) specifies the procedures for pleas of

guilty. Rule 11 of the Rules of Superintendance for
Municipal Courts and County Courts establishes
violation bureaus for minor misdemeanors. Criminal Rule 4.1 prescribes the procedures for such
c·ases.
Offers to Plead Guilty or No Contest
Rule 410 provides that evidence of offers to
plead guilty or no contest as well as statements
made in connection with and relevant to such offers are inadmissible. The exclusion of evidence of
offers to plead guilty or no contest and related
statements applies to all offers and statements
made during an in-court inquiry into the providency
of a guilty or no contest plea. Criminal Rule
11 (C)-( E) establishes detailed procedures for determining the voluntariness of pleas of guilty or no
contest. Under Rule 410 statements made during
Rule 11 hearings are inadmissible if the plea is
later withdrawn or rejected. This is consistent with
Criminal Rule 11(G). Rule 410 goes beyond Criminal Rule 11(G) by specifically excluding statements
as well as offers to plead guilty or no contest.
In addition to in-court statements, Rule 410
covers certain out-of-court offers and statements
that are made in connection with and relevant to
offers to plead guilty or no contest. This clearly
covers offers and statements made during discussions between defense attorneys and prosecutors.
Several federal cases have read Rule 410 broadly
to cover some "plea bargain" statements made
during discussions between defendants and law
enforcement officers. See United States v. Herman,
544 F(2d) 791, 795-99 (5th Cir 1977); United States v.
Brooks, 536 F(2d) 1137, 1138-39 (6th Cir 1976);
United States v. Smith, 525 F(2d) 1017, 1020-22
(10th Cir. 1975). In United States v. Robertson, 582
F(2d) 1356 (5th Cir 1978) (en bane), the Fifth Circuit
established the following test for determining
whether statements fall within the exclusionary
coverage of Federal Rule 410:
The trial court must apply a two-tiered analysis and
determine, first, whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the
time of the discussion, and, second, whether the accused's expectation was reasonable given the totality
of the objective circumstances. /d. at 1366.

Certainly, the language of Rule 410 does not preclude such an interpretation. Moreover, exclusion
is required under Rule 410 notwithstanding the
reading of Miranda warnings. These federal cases
led to the amendment of Federal Rule 410. Federal
Rule 410(4) now limits exclusion to "any statement
made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not
result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea
of guilty later withdrawn."
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